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The Frequency, Predictability, and Proportionality of Jury
Awards of Punitive Damages in State Courts in 2005:
A New Audit
Neil Vidmar & Mirya Holman1
The state of punitive damages in the United States has been a controversial
topic for more than three decades, resulting in litigation reaching the U.S.
Supreme Court and state supreme courts. Various business advocacy groups
have sought to drastically curb or eliminate punitive damages while plaintiffs’
lawyers and consumer groups vigorously defend the use of punitive damages.
State legislatures have responded with many substantive and procedural
reforms over the years. Yet, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,2 the United States
Supreme Court, while approvingly citing empirical evidence indicating that
there are “not mass-produced runaway awards”3 and that “by most accounts the
median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards has remained less than 1:1,”4
once again expressed concerns about punitive awards exceeding a single-digit
ratio to compensatory damages and the predictability of punitive awards. A
full understanding of the issues involved in the punitive damages controversy
requires consideration of the causes of action, the magnitude of both
compensatory and punitive claims, the ratios of these two outcomes, and a
qualitative understanding of the nature of punitive awards. This article presents
a profile of punitive damages awarded by juries in 2005 using the U.S. Bureau
of Justice Statistics’ Civil Justice Survey of State Courts. We supplement the
BJS survey with an additional sample of punitive damages claims from nine
states in 2005. This additional database provides more details about the
disputes and procedural matters associated with the trials. The data show that
there are case-type patterns in the awarding of punitive damages that contradict
claims about punitive awards, especially those involving product liability cases,
and that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is a complex matter not
1. Vidmar is the Russell M. Robinson II Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology at Duke
University. Holman is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Florida Atlantic University. The authors
are indebted to Michael Quick for his excellent research assistance, to George Christie for comments on an
earlier draft of this paper, and to Ted Eisenberg and the participants on a panel at the Conference on Empirical
Legal Scholarship at the University of Southern California in 2009. Finally, and especially, the authors are
indebted to Michael Rustad for his insightful comments and encouragement.
2. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
3. Id. at 2624 (surveying punitive damage literature).
4. Id. at 2624 (describing relative evenness of damage awards).
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easily resolved without consideration of the underlying factual bases of the
claims.
I. INTRODUCTION
Litigation involving punitive damages has been before the U.S. Supreme
Court and various state supreme courts numerous times since the 1980s.5
Central issues in the litigation have involved the relationship between punitive
to compensatory damages, the purposes of punitive damages, and limitations on
when, how, and why juries and judges might award punitive damages. Various
advocacy groups, including the American Tort Reform Association and the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, have sought strict limits on the amounts that can
be awarded for punitive damages, especially in product liability, premises
liability, and similar lawsuits that involve businesses as defendants. These
groups argue that the threat of punitive damages stifles innovation and harms
American businesses.6 In contrast, consumer groups and plaintiffs’ lawyers
assert that punitive damages are necessary, because they are a method of
deterring extraordinary negligence and compensating victims for social
wrongs.7
The Supreme Court, in opinions from Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
5. See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages’ Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L. REV. 1297
(2005); Neil Vidmar & Matthew Wolfe, Punitive Damages, 5 ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI. 179 (2009);
Developments: The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1752 (2000).
6. See, e.g., Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 05-1256); Brief of Oregon
Forest Industries Council & Oregon Grocers Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 05-1256); Brief of the Product Liability
Advisory Council, Inc., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S.
346 (2007) (No. 05-1256); Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219); Brief of
Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.
Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219); Brief of the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219); Brief of the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Pacific
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); Brief of the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., & the
Business Roundtable et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559 (1996) (No. 94-896); AM. TORT REFORM FOUND. JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2009/2010 (2009); VICTOR E.
SCHWARTZ & CARY SILVERMAN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 101 WAYS TO IMPROVE STATE
LEGAL SYSTEMS: A USER’S GUIDE TO PROMOTING FAIR AND EFFECTIVE CIVIL JUSTICE (2009).
7. See, e.g., Brief of Federal Procedural Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Philip
Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 05-1256); Brief of Oregon Trial Lawyers Ass’n as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 05-1256); Brief of
Sociologists, Psychologists, and Law and Economics Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219); Brief of the Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of
America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003) (No. 01-1289); Brief of Certain Leading Social Scientists and Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (No. 01-1289);
CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, ENVIRONMENTAL TORT LAWSUITS: HOLDING POLLUTERS ACCOUNTABLE
(2008); CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: RARE, REASONABLE, AND EFFECTIVE (2007).
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Haslip,8 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,9 State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell,10 Philip Morris USA v. Williams,11 to Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker,12 has expressed concern about the magnitude of some
punitive damage awards, especially the ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages and their relation to case characteristics. In BMW, the Court stated
that “low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio
[of punitive to compensatory damages] if, for example, a particularly egregious
act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.”13 The BMW
Court outlined a three-factor test for evaluating whether a punitive damage was
excessive: (1) the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity
between the compensatory award and the punitive damage award; and (3) the
existence and amount of any alternative state sanctions for similar
misconduct.14 In BMW and again in State Farm, the Court further expressed a
guideline indicating that harms involving financial injury should be seen as less
deserving of high punitive damages ratios than harms involving personal
injuries. In Haslip, the Court found that a punitive to compensatory damage
ratio of 4:1 was “close to the line” on unconstitutionality.15 In State Farm, the
Court suggested that ordinarily punitive damages should not exceed
compensatory damages, and a ratio of single digit (that is, 9:1) is the outer limit
of punitive to compensatory damages.16 The Court further stated “[o]ur
jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate, however,
that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”17
Yet, Michael Rustad, in his review of punitive damages legislation across
the United States, argued that when state legislatures have decided that punitive
damages are a problem, they have enacted substantive or procedural reforms
intended to curb excesses.18 The procedural reforms include restrictions on
pleading, discovery, evidence, jury instructions, increases in the standard of
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

499 U.S. 1 (1991).
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
538 U.S. 408 (2003).
549 U.S. 346 (2007).
128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
See BMW, 517 U.S. at 582.
See BMW, 517 U.S. at 574-75. See generally Virginia Canipe, Note, Crossing the Excessiveness
Line: The Implications of BMW v. Gore on Multi-Billion Dollar Tobacco Litigation Punitive Damages, 36
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157 (2001); Son B. Nguyen, Note, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: Elevating
Reasonableness in Punitive Damages to a Doctrine of Substantive Due Process, 57 MD. L. REV. 251 (1998).
15. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991); see also BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996) (reiterating holding in Haslip).
16. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
17. Id. (citing Haslip and Gore).
18. See Rustad, supra note 5, at 1300-01 (noting various state legislative reforms involving punitive
damages); see also Sheila B. Scheuerman & Anthony J. Franze, Instructing Juries on Punitive Damages: Due
Process Revisited After Philip Morris v. Williams, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW 1147, 1168-91 (2008) (noting
states’ revisions to punitive damage instructions after Haslip and State Farm).
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proof for punitive damages, and devices such as bifurcation and restrictions on
the use of wealth to ensure greater judicial control over punitive awards, while
substantive reforms include caps on the amount of the punitive damage award.
Indeed, Rustad argued that the U.S. Supreme Court and state legislatures “have
constructed a pro-defendant iron cage” around punitive damages.19 The
circumstances under which punitive damages are allowed and the relationship
between compensatory and punitive damages vary dramatically from state to
state.20 As shown in Appendix A, in all but five states that allow punitive
damages, such awards are substantially limited, either in definition or in
application.21
Empirical research on punitive damages generally suggests that punitive
damages do not endanger the legal system. Specifically, scholars have found
that punitive awards have not increased in frequency over time; most awards
are modest in size and show a reasonable proportionality between harm and
potential harm of conduct; juries pay particular attention to the reprehensibility
of conduct; and there is little evidence supporting the claim that juries are
biased against businesses.22 The most recent U.S. Supreme Court case
involving punitive damages, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, concerned maritime
law but has implied relevance for state tort law. Therein, the Court agreed with
the empirical findings, but with a major reservation.
Justice Souter, writing for the Exxon Shipping majority, reviewed part of the
body of empirical evidence bearing on punitive damages.23 He concluded that
empirical research showed that there are “not mass-produced runaway
awards”24 and that “by most accounts the median ratio of punitive to
compensatory awards has remained less than 1:1.”25 Justice Souter also
concluded that the research showed no marked increase in awards over the past
several decades. Nevertheless, he asserted, “the real problem, it seems, is the
stark unpredictability of punitive awards.”26 He went on to refer to an analysis
of the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts conducted by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics (BJS), concluding:
A recent comprehensive study of punitive damages awarded by juries in state
civil trials found a median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards of just

19. See Rustad, supra note 5, at 1301 (discussing constraints on punitive damage awards).
20. See Appendix A (surveying legal and monetary limits on punitive damages by state).
21. See id. (indicating punitive damages not allowed in Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, and Washington).
22. See Brief of Neil Vidmar & Brian Bornstein et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Philip
Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 05-1256) (reciting empirical findings indicating juries
perform reaonsably).
23. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2624-27 (2008) (citing punitive damage research)
24. Id. at 2624.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2625.
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0.62:1, but a mean ratio of 2.90:1 and a standard deviation of 13.81 . . . . Even
to those of us unsophisticated in statistics, the thrust of these figures is clear:
the spread is great, and the outlier cases subject defendants to punitive damages
that dwarf the corresponding compensatories . . . . Other studies of some of the
same data show that fully 14% of punitive awards in 2001 were greater than
four times the compensatory damages . . . with 18% of punitives in the 1990s
more than trebling the compensatory damages . . . . And a study of “financial
injury” cases using a different data set found that 34% of the punitive awards
27
were greater than three times the corresponding compensatory damages.

Theodore Eisenberg, Michael Heise, and Martin Wells have replied to
Justice Souter’s analysis, arguing that Justice Souter missed the fact that
variability of awards relates to the level of the compensatory awards.28 To
demonstrate this argument, Eisenberg and his co-authors reexamined the results
of the study relied upon by the Court in Exxon Shipping. By comparing the
levels of compensatory awards with the punitive award, those authors
concluded that most of the variability in the punitive to compensatory award
ratios was associated with cases at the low end of compensatory damage
awards, specifically those involving less than $10,000 in compensatory
damages.29 In cases involving compensatory awards under $1000, the mean
ratio was roughly 100:1, and cases involving compensatory awards under
$10,000 had a ratio of approximately 10:1.30 However, for cases involving
over $10,000 in compensatory damages, the mean ratios were approximately
1.5:1 with standard deviations ranging from 1.31 to 3.58.31 In short, a
substantial amount of the variability in the punitive to compensatory damage
ratios was associated with cases on the very low end of the monetary scale.
The research of Eisenberg and his co-authors represents an important
contribution to understanding the profile of punitive damages, but it is
incomplete. Previous research by Rustad, Eisenberg, and Vidmar and Rose has
drawn attention to the causes of action as factors related to the likelihood and
magnitude of punitive damages.32 For example, Vidmar and Rose’s research
27. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2625 (2008) (citations omitted); see generally
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice
Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263 (2006).
28. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive Damages: An Empirical Assessment of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Decision in Exxon Shipping v. Baker (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 09-011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1392438.
29. See id. at 14 (highlighting punitive-compensatory ratio).
30. See id. at 15, Table 2 (presenting summary statistics of jury cases involving punitive and
compensatory damages).
31. See id. at 15, Table 2 (analyzing summary statistics).
32. See generally Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability Of Punitive Damages, 26 J. OF LEGAL
STUD. 623 (1997) (noting strong correlation between punitive and compensatory damages); Michael L. Rustad,
Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 WISC. L. REV. 15 (1998) (indicating
no nationwide punitive damage crisis); Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Product Liability:
Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1992) (suggesting punitive damage awards in
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indicates that, in Florida, while the median ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages over all cases between 1989 and 1998 was 0.67:1, there was
substantial variability across case types.33 Cases involving funeral homes’
improper treatment of dead persons had a median ratio of 6.3:1, while cases
involving discrimination or harassment claims had a ratio of 2.3:1.34 Vidmar
and Rose also documented nuances in juries’ application of punitive damages
within the subset of products and premises liability cases.35 In one case a jury
awarded only compensatory damages against a corporate defendant but levied
punitive damages (in a modest amount) against its drunken employee who was
driving the delivery truck that injured the plaintiff.36
It is important to observe that the Supreme Court itself has been inconsistent
in its application of the proportionality ratio. Although in State Farm Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, asserted, “in practice, few awards exceeding
a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a
significant degree, will satisfy due process,” the Court previously
acknowledged that there are cases in which the compensable injury will be
small but the reprehensibility of the conduct is great.37 Thus, in 1993 the Court
approved an extremely large ratio in a case involving a financial injury. TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.38 involved a business dispute
over an oil and gas contract. The Court upheld a jury award of $10,000,000 in
punitive damages compared to a compensatory damage award of only $19,000
(a 526:1 ratio), describing the behavior of TXO as “egregiously tortious
conduct.”39 In March 2009, the Court denied certiorari in a re-appeal of the
Philip Morris USA v. Williams verdict, thus tacitly allowing a punitive award of
$79,500,000 against a compensatory award of $502,100, yielding a punitive to
compensatory ratio of 158:1.40
In the present research, we focus only on jury verdicts and ignore verdicts
rendered by judges in bench trials. We do so on the grounds that most of the
criticism regarding punitive damages centers on the jury and that cases decided
in bench trials tend to be different than cases decided by juries, making

products liability cases should be studied empirically); Neil Vidmar & M. R. Rose, Punitive Damages by Juries
in Florida: In Terrorem and in Reality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487 (2001) (studying punitive damage awards
in Florida).
33. See Vidmar & Rose, supra note 32, at 493-94 (noting variability in median across years explained by
case type).
34. See id. at 500 (discussing variability of awards by cause of action).
35. See id. at 496-500 (noting punitives awarded in 16 of 20 products liability, 14 of 17 premises liability
cases).
36. See id. at 500 (reciting facts of premises liability case involving alcohol consumption).
37. 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
38. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
39. Id. at 466.
40. See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009) (dismissing writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted).
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comparisons difficult.41
We first develop a profile of punitive damages from the 2005 Civil Justice
Survey of State Courts.42 We supplement these data with a second database
involving punitive damages claims in Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Using Westlaw,
we developed a systematic search method that provided qualitative information
on the wide variety of cases reported in 2005 by jury verdict reporters. While
verdict reporters are selective in reporting cases, they do contain additional
verdicts outside of the selected counties of the BJS data and, more importantly
for our present purpose, they often provide rich qualitative details about causes
of action and procedural processes associated with the case and resulting
verdict. These details provide insight bearing on the litigation outcome.43
II. METHOD
The first part of our analysis uses the 2005 Civil Justice Survey of State
Courts. Although the 2005 survey added additional counties to its list of
surveyed courts, the present report is based upon the publicly available data
archived in the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research
(ICPSR) at the University of Michigan. The data provide information on all
completed civil jury cases from the forty-six largest county courts in the United
States. These data are statistically representative of the seventy-five largest
county courts in the United States.44 As mentioned above, in contrast to
previous surveys, the 2005 data include a variable indicating whether, in the
pleadings, either party requested punitive damages. These new data on
requests for punitive damages allow for a more accurate measure of the rate of
prevailing in cases with claims for punitive damages.
To complement the BJS data, we constructed a database from verdict
reporters in Westlaw for all jury trial cases resolved in 2005 where the court
reporter mentions punitive damages. Using Westlaw’s jury verdict reporters
for each state, we searched for “punitive damages,” excluding all cases that did
not match our criteria.45 The cases are from Arizona (forty-five cases),
41. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the
Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 263-65
(2006) (distinguishing jury- from court-awarded damages).
42. See generally LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL BENCH AND JURY
TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 (2008) (providing statistics regarding damage award amounts). The 2005
survey added a new variable that was not coded in the 1992, 1996 and 2001 surveys, namely whether punitive
damages were requested in the pleadings by one of the parties. This allows us to estimate the success rates
when plaintiffs seek punitive damages.
43. See Cynthia Lee & Nicole Waters, A Verdict on the Reporters: The Representativeness of
Commercially Published Jury Reports, Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association
(May 25, 2009) (noting discrepancy between Civil Justice Survey data and jury verdict reports).
44. See http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/23862 (collecting data on general civil and
non-trial 2005 matters).
45. We coded by: (1) state; (2) Westlaw number; (3) whether the case was tried by a jury; (4) the date of
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California (eighty-five cases), Florida (thirty-four cases), Illinois (twenty
cases), Missouri (forty-seven cases), New York (thirty-three cases), New Jersey
(fifteen cases), Pennsylvania (thirteen cases), and Texas (110 cases). Although
Lee and Waters’ 2009 research indicates that verdict reports are often not
representative of all the cases appearing in the courts, they often contain
information bearing on the procedural details after the filing of the claims and
the substantive content of the claims. Both of these pieces of information allow
inferences as to why the jury awarded or did not award punitive damages and
on the amounts of the awards.
III. RESULTS FROM THE BJS DATABASE
A. Frequency of Punitive Damage Requests
We first examine how frequently either party requests punitive damages.
Typically, the party is the plaintiff; but in some instances, such as business
disputes, the defendant asks for punitive damages by counterclaim. The bottom
row in Table 1 reports that in the forty-six largest counties in the U.S. in 2005,
there were 6472 cases tried by juries. Punitive damages were requested in 567
instances, or approximately 9% of all jury trials.
Table 1 disaggregates these overall data by the causes of action as
categorized by the BJS coding system reporting the number of times that at
least one of the parties requested punitive damages.
TABLE 1: TOTAL AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES, BY CLAIM TYPE
NUMBER OF
PLAINTIFF CLAIM TYPE

NUMBER
OF CASES

PERCENT OF

PERCENT

CASES

CASES

OF ALL

REQUESTING

REQUESTING

TRIALS

PUNITIVE

PUNITIVE

DAMAGES

DAMAGES

Motor Vehicle Tort

2,673

42%

92

3%

Premises Liability

803

12%

22

3%

Product Liability (Asbestos)

51

1%

6

12%

the verdict; (5) the claim type according to the BJS category,; (6) the type of tort involved, including personal
injury, dignitary, and financial injury; (7) the number of plaintiffs; (8) the number of defendants; (9) the amount
sought in damages; (10) whether the plaintiff prevailed on any compensatory negligence defense; (11) the total
amount of compensatory award; (12) whether the plaintiff prevailed on a punitive negligence claim; (13) the
total amount of the punitive award, if any; (14) reasons the plaintiff did not prevail on punitive claim, including
that: (a) the judge refused to allow before trial; (b) the judge allowed plaintiff to argue claim but refused to
instruct jury; (c) the jury refused to award punitives; (d) the jury awarded punitives, but the judge rejected the
award in judgment; (e) the parties settled the punitive damages claim during or before trial; (f) the jury found
punitive negligence but gave no punitives; (15) the jury awarded punitives but the judge remitted the amount (1
= yes; 2 = no); (16) a brief synopsis of the case and any unusual characteristics.

VIDMARHOLMAN_LEAD_FORMATTED_6952884.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

8/4/2010 8:37 AM

PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN STATE COURTS IN 2005: A NEW AUDIT
Product Liability (Other)

118

2%

13

11%

Intentional Tort

212

3%

49

23%

Malpractice (Medical)

980

15%

58

6%

Malpractice (Other)

51

1%

5

10%

Slander, Libel, Defamation

40

1%

18

45%

Animal Attack

39

1%

6

15%

Conversion

29

0%

12

41%

False Arrest /Imprisonment

22

0%

4

18%

Other Negligence

170

3%

13

8%

Fraud

255

4%

71

28%

Seller Plaintiff (Contract)

166

3%

18

11%

Buyer Plaintiff (Contract)

315

5%

45

14%

Mortgage Foreclosure

5

0%

1

20%

Employment (Discrimination)

117

2%

42

36%

Employment (Other)

117

2%

34

29%

Rental/Lease Agreement

51

1%

9

18%

Intentional/Tortious Interference

51

1%

18

35%

Partnership Dispute

21

0%

7

33%

Other/Unknown Commercial

47

1%

11

23%

Subrogation

6

0%

2

33%

Eminent Domain/Condemnation

54

1%

0

0%

Title or Boundary Dispute

26

0%

8

31%

Other/Unknown Real Property

8

0%

3

38%

Total/ Average Percent

6,427

99%

567

8.8%

863

Table 1 demonstrates that plaintiffs’ requests for punitive damages varied
significantly by cause of action. Requests for punitive damages were most
frequently made in suits involving slander or defamation (45%), conversion
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(41%), real property disputes (38%), employment discrimination (36%),
tortious interference (35%), partnership disputes (33%) and subrogated claims
(33%). Plaintiffs in cases involving motor vehicle claims (3%), premises
liability claims (3%) and medical malpractice claims (6%) rarely sought
punitive damages. In non-asbestos product liability cases, one of the most
frequently cited topics in the controversy over punitive damages, punitive
damages were only requested 11% of the time.46
B. The Likelihood of Prevailing on General Negligence and Punitive Damages
Ordinarily, the party requesting punitive damages cannot prevail unless first
prevailing on the claim of general compensatory negligence.47 There is a
general presumption that a party making a claim for punitive damages has a
strong case for compensatory negligence. The second issue of interest relating
to claims for punitive damages is the likelihood of the jury awarding punitive
damages. Table 2 reports the frequency with which the party requesting
punitive damages prevailed.
TABLE 2: PLAINTIFF WINS BY PLAINTIFF CLAIM TYPE
PUNITIVE

PLAINTIFF CLAIM TYPE

DAMAGES

WINS ON
COMPENSATORY

REQUESTED

PERCENT WIN

WINS ON

ON

COMPENSATORY

PUNITIVE

PERCENT
WIN ON
PUNITIVE

Motor Vehicle Tort

92

59

64%

12

13%

Premises Liability

22

9

41%

1

5%

Product Liability (Asbestos)

6

2

33%

1

17%

Product Liability (Other)

13

1

8%

0

0%

Intentional Tort

49

33

67%

21

43%

Malpractice (Medical)

58

16

28%

4

7%

Malpractice (Other)

5

3

60%

1

20%

Slander, Libel, Defamation

18

12

67%

9

50%

46. Nineteen of the punitive damages cases arising out of product litigation involved prescription drugs
(such as Phen-fen), while three involved tobacco.
47. See Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872, 881 (W. Va. 1982) (affirming jury award of punitive damages
notwithstanding lack of compensatory damages). The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that a
defendant could be liable for punitive damages even if the jury did not award the plaintiff any compensatory
damages. Indeed, in Shulman v. Hunderfund, a New York defamation case discussed later in this paper, the
jury found the defendant liable and awarded $100,000 in punitives but gave nothing for compensatory
damages. See Shulman v. Hunderfund, 852 N.Y.S.2d 178, 180 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) rev’d 905 N.E.2d 1159
(N.Y. 2009).
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Animal Attack

6

6

100%

0

0%

Conversion

12

6

50%

4

33%

False Arrest /Imprisonment

4

0

0%

0

0%

Other Negligence

13

7

54%

4

31%

Fraud

71

54

76%

26

37%

Seller Plaintiff (Contract)

18

13

72%

3

17%

Buyer Plaintiff (Contract)

45

31

69%

12

27%

Mortgage Foreclosure

1

1

100%

0

0%

Employment
(Discrimination)

42

25

60%

5

12%

Employment (Other)

34

19

56%

11

32%

Rental/Lease Agreement

9

6

67%

2

22%

Intentional /Tortious
Interference

18

11

61%

5

28%

Partnership Dispute

7

6

86%

3

43%

11

8

73%

4

36%

Subrogation

2

2

100%

1

50%

Eminent
Domain/Condemnation

0

0

--

--

--

Title or Boundary Dispute

8

0

--

2

25%

Other/Unknown Real
Property

3

0

--

--

0%

TOTAL /MEAN
PERCENTAGE

567

330

58%

131

23%

Other/Unknown Contract

As Table 2 shows, a party’s request for punitive damages is generally
associated with prevailing on liability for compensatory negligence, but is not a
guarantee of winning. Columns three and four of Table 2 present, by cause of
action, the frequency with which cases involving punitive damages claims
resulted in a party prevailing on liability for general compensatory negligence.
The only category in which claims for punitive damages always resulted in a
compensatory win for the plaintiff were cases involving animal attacks and
mortgage foreclosures. The number of such cases was very small, however,
(six and one, respectively) and none of the cases involving animal attacks or
mortgage foreclosures resulted in large punitive damage awards. Overall, the
chance of prevailing on a compensatory negligence claim if punitive damages
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were requested was 58%, but, again, the outcome varied by cause of action. In
short, requesting punitive damages in pleadings was no guarantee that a party
would prevail even on the general compensatory negligence claim.
The last two columns in Table 2 report the number of instances in which the
plaintiff prevailed on the punitive damages claim after prevailing on
compensatory liability. The last row in Table 2 shows that, of the 567 instances
in which a party requested punitive damages, such damages were awarded 131
times, or in 23% of trials. However, if we examine the rate of success in
punitive damages awards by the type of claim, we again find considerable
variability. In particular, despite assertions about the dangers posed by product
liability cases mentioned in the introduction to this article, there was only one
instance of a punitive damage award in product liability cases in the 2005
survey and that involved an asbestos claim. There were no punitive damages
awarded in non-asbestos product liability cases. There was only one punitive
damage award among the premises liability cases. In contrast, parties
requesting punitive damages in slander and defamation cases—some of which,
as we will see, appear to arise out of business disputes—prevailed half of the
time. In intentional torts and partnership dispute cases where the plaintiff or
defendant requested punitive damages, the jury awarded those damages 43% of
the time. In short, these data contradict the images fostered by tort reform
groups that juries side with individuals suing businesses and provide large
punitive damage awards. Rather, the beneficiaries of punitive damages are
often business plaintiffs suing business defendants.48
C. Variables Associated with Failure to Obtain Punitive Damages
The BJS data show only whether the pleadings indicated that punitive
damages were requested. The data, however, do not give further information
bearing on what occurred after the parties requested punitive damages. Yet, as
Table 2 indicates, asking for punitive damages by no means guarantees that a
jury will award compensatory or punitive damages. Indeed, the success rates
were quite low for most causes of action. One explanation for these low
success rates, as indicated in Table 2, was that the party did not succeed on the
claim of compensatory damages.49
While we will discuss the Westlaw jury report data in detail in the next
section, it is worthwhile digressing to those data here because they provide
additional insights about Table 2, specifically, the procedural processes bearing
on the failure of plaintiffs to recover punitive damages.50 Many states have
48. See VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
(2000) (discussing jury attitudes toward business defendants).
49. Looking at the rates of prevailing on liability, plaintiffs are as likely to prevail on liability whether
they ask for punitive damages or not.
50. We caution, again, that the Westlaw data are neither comprehensive nor a random sample of cases.
Furthermore, the record of procedural details is often incomplete and thus cannot provide reliable estimates of

VIDMARHOLMAN_LEAD_FORMATTED_6952884.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN STATE COURTS IN 2005: A NEW AUDIT

8/4/2010 8:37 AM

867

engaged in limiting punitive damages awards by either requiring “clear and
convincing evidence” or by limiting the pleading of punitive damages to a
separate stage only after a plaintiff succeeds in winning compensatory
damages. Rustad’s Iron Cage outlines, in detail, the procedural limitations on
punitive damages in each state.51 We focus on the six primary paths that result
in the non-award of a plaintiff’s punitive damages claim during the trial.
1. The trial judge refused the plaintiff the opportunity to plead punitive
damages before the trial began.
In Pena v. Ford Motor Co.,52 a product liability case, the defendants
received partial summary judgment on the punitive damages claim before the
trial started. A Missouri case, Locke v. Suntrup Hyundai Inc.53 involved a sales
tax dispute over the purchase of an automobile; the judge denied a claim for
punitive damages. In Nolan v. Myerly,54 an animal attack case, the defendant
was granted summary judgment before the trial began. We suspect, but cannot
prove from the present data, that this is the most frequent cause of failure to
win on an initial punitive damages claim. In most jurisdictions, the plaintiff
must demonstrate willful, wanton, or malicious behavior, and judges appear to
be exercising their statutory or common law discretion in pre-trial
proceedings.55
2. The plaintiff decided, for whatever reason, not to plead for punitive
damages at the start or end of the trial.
In Tual v. Blake,56 the plaintiff initially asked for but then did not press for
punitive damages in an intentional tort case.
3. The plaintiff did not prevail on compensatory liability.
As already noted, Table 2 indicates that failure to prevail on compensatory
damages accounted for a substantial number of cases in which punitive
damages were sought. Table 2 also shows that the success rates in obtaining
punitive damages varied substantially by case type. Generally, regardless of
the type of case, asking for punitive damages is not a good predictor of success
in obtaining compensatory damages.
the actual frequencies of the various procedural events. However, despite these shortcomings, the data yield
important information bearing on why litigants who request punitive damages in the pleadings often fail to
receive them.
51. See generally Rustad, supra note 5, at 1299 (noting “far-reaching procedural safeguards”
constraining punitive damages). Rustad surveys the standards and limits on punitive damages in all 51 United
States jurisdictions in his article. See Rustad, supra note 5, at 1370-1417 (surveying all states and D.C.)
52. No. CV2002-022937, 2005 WL 3288763 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2005) (verdict summary)
(assessing costs for defendant automobile maker).
53. No. 04CC-003604, 2005 WL 4858939 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Oct. 12, 2005) (verdict summary) (awarding
$936 to plaintiff for amount sales tax on claim of misrepresentation of contract).
54. No. RIC359499, 2005 WL 4880604 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 17, 2005) (verdict summary) (awarding
$207,600 for plaintiff).
55. See Rustad, supra note 5, at 1327 (describing different jurisdictions’ approaches to punitive
damages).
56. No. EC034380, 2005 WL 3677180 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2005) (verdict summary) (awarding
$30,000,000 in damages).
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4. The judge deferred the decision on punitive damages until the end of the
trial, but then ruled against instructing the jury that they could consider
punitive damages or, alternatively, allowed the pleading but subsequently
remitted the award.
Leon v. Billings57 involved a medical malpractice claim accompanied by a
claim of battery. The judge allowed the plea and argument of punitive damages
but then entered a directed verdict against punitive damages at the close of the
plaintiff’s case.58 In Tummillo v. Gallagher,59 plaintiff condominium buyers
sued the sellers for fraud, alleging that the sellers failed to disclose the full
extent of water damage to the condo. The jury awarded $5000 in punitive
damages, but nothing for compensatory damages and the trial judge then
remitted the entire punitive award.
5. The jury awarded compensatory damages but refused to award punitive
damages.
In Ameri v. Bouzari,60 a business dispute involving charges of fraud, the jury
found punitive negligence on the part of both the plaintiff and defendant and
consequently awarded no punitive damages to either party. Cappa v. CrossTest
Inc.61 involved an employment claim in which there was a nonsuit on the
plaintiff’s claim; the jury found for the cross-complainant on a counterclaim,
including a finding of malice, but awarded no punitive damages. Hall-Edwards
v. Ford Motor Co.62 involved a product liability claim. The jury found that
Ford placed a vehicle on the market with a defect relating to its stability and
handling, which was a legal cause of the accident, but no punitive damages
were awarded.63
6. The opposing parties reached a private settlement on punitive damages
before or during the trial, thus preempting the jury from hearing the punitive
damages claim.
In Witherow v. Omm, Inc.,64 a negligence claim involving a construction
death, the parties privately settled the claim for punitive damages, but the
negligence claim went to the jury and resulted in nearly $7,000,000 in

57. No. CI002-2769 Div. 33, 2005 WL 3626816 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 2005) (verdict summary)
(awarding $1,250,000 in damages).
58. See id. (reciting facts).
59. No. 02 L 844, 2005 WL 3941260 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 29, 2005) (verdict summary) (noting verdict of
$5000 reduced to $0 by judge order).
60. No. CV2004-006498, 2005 WL 3728776 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Oct. 19, 2005) (verdict summary) (noting
mixed verdict, no damages on any count).
61. No. CIV 440552, 2005 WL 4708227 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2005) (verdict summary) (indicating
jury elected not to award punitive damages despite finding of malice).
62. No. 99-9450CA 22, 2005 WL 3999843 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 15, 2005) (verdict summary) (noting jury
awarded plaintiff $61,200,000).
63. See id.
64. No. 02-09668 Div. E, 2005 WL 3030126 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 2005) (verdict summary) (noting
award of $6,887,000 on negligence claim).
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compensatory damages. In Meuser v. Weaver,65 a motor vehicle lawsuit, the
parties stipulated to $100,000 in punitive damages in a pre-trial agreement. In
Williams v. Renaissance at Hillside Inc.,66 an Illinois case involving claims that
nursing home negligence led to bedsores and required a ventilator for the
patient over a period of two years, the defendant settled for $2,800,000 shortly
after the trial judge ruled that the jury could hear any claims relating to punitive
damages.
Finally, attention should be given to the fact that, as already mentioned
above, in some cases (especially involving financial disputes), the punitive
damages claims were made in counterclaims by defendants. This significantly
clouds the picture of who receives punitive damages. In a few instances, the
plaintiff asked for punitive damages and the defendant, in a countersuit, asked
for punitive damages. In other cases, while the plaintiff did not request
punitive damages, the defendant pled for punitive damages.
D. Size and Ratios of Punitive Damages to Compensatory Damages by Type of
Case
We turn now to the central concerns of the Supreme Court about the overall
size of awards, the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, and the
relationship of case characteristics to the ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages. We examine this problem from several directions. First, we consider
the Supreme Court’s assertion in BMW and later in State Farm that harms
involving financial injury are usually less deserving of high punitive to
compensatory damage ratios than harms involving personal injuries. In theory,
it would be important to examine each of the individual BJS categories set out
in Tables 1 and 2, but doing so would not allow meaningful comparisons
because of the small number of cases in most of the categories. However, the
BJS database combines the individual categories into four general categories of
claims: personal injury torts, financial injury torts, employment related claims
and claims related to property. We utilize this same categorization system as
the first part of our exploration of the relationship of punitive to compensatory
awards. Table 3 reports the punitive to compensatory relationships on a
number of statistical dimensions.

65. No. CIV223098, 2005 WL 5266836 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (verdict summary) (indicating
stipulated punitive award of $100,000).
66. No. 02-1-002286, 2005 WL 3054475 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 2005) (verdict summary) (summarizing
$2,800,000 award).
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TABLE 3: PUNITIVE AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES, BY CASE TYPE
PERSONAL

FINANCIAL

INJURY

INJURY

TORT

TORT

VARIABLE

EMPLOYMENT

PROPERTY

Number Asking for Punitive Damages

281

152

76

58

Percent Asking for Punitive Damages

6%

16%

32%

22%

Number Winning Punitive Damages

53

45

16

17

Percent Winning Punitive Damages

19%

30%

21%

29%

Mean Compensatory Damages When Punitive

$2,250,987

$2,882,828

$4,425,398

$2,381,849

$118,000

$125,000

$305,954

$185,105

$2,175,978

$2,196,750

$8,327,674

$4,156,070

$100,000

$150,000

$345,000

$800,000

Mean Punitive: Compensatory Ratio

5:2

3:1

11:6

19:4

Median Punitive: Compensatory Ratio

1:1

1:1

1:1

4:3

Damages Were Awarded
Model Compensatory Damages if Punitive
Damages Were Awarded
Mean Punitive Damages if Punitive Damages
Were Awarded
Model Punitive Damages if Punitive Damages
Were Awarded

We first look at the percent of cases where punitive damages were requested,
and the rates at which they were awarded. As Table 3 shows, personal injury
torts had the fewest requests for punitive damages (6%) and the lowest success
rate (19%). Litigants in financial injury cases requested punitive damages 16%
of the time and prevailed on the request 30% of the time. Employment-related
claims requested punitive damages about one-third of the time (32% of cases),
but the requesting litigant prevailed in only about one case of five (21%).
Litigants in property cases requested punitive damages in 22% of cases and
prevailed 29% of the time.
Table 3 also shows that the mean compensatory award in all four types of
cases exceeded $2,000,000, but claims involving employment were nearly
twice as large as the other three categories. This possibly reflects the fact that
many employment-related claims involved multiple plaintiffs, including class
actions. However, the modal compensatory awards were in the lower hundreds
of thousands for all four case types. In short, the differences between mean and
modal awards suggest substantial variation in the underlying compensatory
negligence claims. Looking at the average and modal punitive awards, Table 3
shows that employment cases had the highest mean and modal punitive awards
among the four case types. Examining the ratio between compensatory and
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punitive damages, we see that the mean ratio varied across case types.
However, the last row of Table 2 shows that the median ratio for three of the
case types was 1:1, with the median for property cases slightly above, at 4:3.
There are alternative ways to look at the data that may be more illuminating.
For instance, Table 4 presents data regarding the number of cases resulting in
punitive to compensatory ratios exceeding a single digit (10:1 or higher).67
TABLE 4: THE RATIO OF COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
COMPENSATORY AWARD

NUMBER OF CASES

MEAN PUNITIVE TO
COMPENSATORY RATIO

NUMBER OF CASES WITH
RATIOS > 9:1

$0-999

6

Undefined

4

$1k-9,999

16

5.3:1

5

$10k-99,999

33

4.2:1

4

$100k-999,999

42

1.8:1

0

$1M-9,999,999

26

2.4:1

1

$10M or Greater

8

1.0:1

0

TOTAL

131

14

Table 4 shows that only 14 of the 131 cases resulting in a punitive damages
award had ratios exceeding a single digit. These figures, however, need further
clarification.68
E. Punitive Damages Ratios in Cases with Small Compensatory Damages
The data in Tables 3 and 4 provide enough information to compile a basic
profile of punitive to compensatory damage ratios. However, as Table 3
shows, dramatically different conclusions can be drawn from the data,
depending on whether the summary statistic is the mean or the median award.
At some level summary statistics cannot fully address concerns expressed in
the various Supreme Court decisions about the uncertainty of punitive damages
or the appropriateness of the ratios between punitive and compensatory
damages. As we reviewed in the introduction to this article, the Supreme Court
has recognized that there are classes of awards where compensable injury will
67. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 28 (stratifying cases by the amount of money awarded in
compensatory damages). Eisenberg found that in the BJS 1992, 1996 and 2000 samples the highest punitive to
compensatory ratios involved cases in which compensatory awards were under $10,000. Id. at 15-16.
68. The low number of cases with a ratio exceeding the Supreme Court’s specification of single digits
can also be weighted even lower; all of the cases with a punitive damage award and a compensatory award of
less than $1000 (the first row of Table 4) have no compensatory damage award, meaning that the ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages is incalculable.
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be modest (or nil) but the behavior is judged to be highly reprehensible.
Shulman v. Hunderfund,69 was a defamation case in which the jury awarded
punitive damages for $100,000, but gave no award for compensatory damages.
The BJS database limits our insights about punitive damages cases decided by
juries because it lacks substantive details about the cases. Therefore, we now
turn to our database constructed from Westlaw, emphasizing both qualitative
and quantitative data.70
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS BY
SELECTED STATES
As we just discussed, some cases (such as Shulman v. Hunderfund) appear to
demonstrate exceptions to the single-digit standard. Thus, while the BJS
quantitative information provides us with representative general patterns, we
argue that a qualitative analysis will help to place the jury verdicts in factual
context.71 In the discussion that follows, we focus on punitive to compensatory
ratios that exceed the single-digit standard, but in a few instances also draw
attention to some very large punitive awards even when the punitive to
compensatory ratios were nevertheless below a single digit.
A. Arizona
A search of Arizona’s jury verdict reports revealed forty-five cases in which
a party requested punitive damages. However, only three cases resulted in
punitive damages, one of which exceeded the single-digit ratio. Appendix A
shows that Arizona’s standard for punitive damages requires that the defendant
engage in behavior that involves a substantial risk of harm, for both general and
specific deterrence, or behavior that constitutes “outrageous conduct.”72
Burden v. May73 involved an intentional tort claim by an off-duty police officer,
still in uniform, who alleged that he had been assaulted in a bar by a hockey
player. The jury awarded the plaintiff $1570 in compensatory damages and
$25,000 in punitive damages, yielding a punitive to compensatory ratio of
16:1.74 While this case exceeds the Supreme Court’s suggested ratio of 9:1, the
actual size of the awards ($1570 and $25,000) are far lower than the “runaway”
punitive damage awards that legislators and lobbyists point out when
69. 905 N.E.2d 1159 (N.Y. 2009).
70. The complete data from the Westlaw research is available upon request from the authors.
71. Keep in mind that, unlike the BJS data, the cases are not a random sample and are almost certainly
weighted toward plaintiffs emerging as winners, often with large awards.
72. See Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Ariz. 1987) (noting punitive damages
available when plaintiff proves defendant acted with “evil mind”); Smith v. Chapman, 564 P.2d 900, 903 (Ariz.
1977) (indicating punitive damages available in Arizona for outrageous conduct or reckless indifference). See
generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 908, cmt. b (1939).
73. No. 1 CA-CV 06-0486, 2007 WL 5447050 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2007)
74. See id. at 1-2 (reciting facts).
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advocating for changes to the tort system.75
B. California
The Westlaw search of verdict reports yielded eighty-six trials in which one
of the litigating parties requested punitive damages in the pleadings, but only
forty-one of the cases involved punitive damages claims at trial.76 Some of
these trials overlapped with the BJS cases. Fourteen of the cases involved
punitive ratios of 1:1 or less; eleven had ratios of 2:1 or less; five had ratios of
4:1 or less; six had ratios of less than 10:1; and five cases exceeded the
Supreme Court’s single-digit guideline.
The largest punitive to compensatory ratio was in iTech Group Inc. v.
National Semiconductor.77 The case involved a commercial dispute in which
the economic loss was $234,358 and the punitive award was over $15,000,000,
resulting in a ratio of 64:1. iTech was a start-up company that alleged breach
of contract by National Semiconductor under the parties’ software licensing
agreement and fraud for misstatements National made relative to its stated
intent to provide source code software to iTech.78 In certain ways, iTech is
similar to TXO, in which the Supreme Court allowed an extremely large
punitive to compensatory ratio in a business dispute. Both iTech and TXO
illustrate again that many of the large punitive damage awards are in cases that
involve a business-to-business dispute; these cases are often ignored by those
seeking to reform or limit punitive damages by focusing on consumers suing
businesses.
A second case demonstrates the use of punitive damages as a method of
punishing behavior that society views as reprehensible. In Goddard v. Holy
Cross Catholic Cemetery,79 a cemetery lost cremated remains (called cremains)
and conspired not to report the loss to the deceased’s family while still selling
the plaintiffs a headstone for the grave. The jury awarded $12,113 in actual
damages and $400,000 in punitives, yielding a ratio of 33:1.80 Goddard is a
case where the ability of the jury to award a large punitive damage was limited
by the cost of the product, in this case $12,113, which is a small amount. To
express the reprehensibility of the action, the jury rendered a large punitive
75. See Engle Verdict Defies Common Sense, Florida Law; PhilipMorris Says Court Created Runaway
Jury, BUSINESS WIRE, July 14, 2000 available at http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/trial-procedure-jurytrial/6470981-1html (discussing $145 billion jury verdict).
76. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (2010). Compared to Arizona’s standard, California’s standard for
punitive damages is more liberal, allowing for punitive damages when the defendant engages in oppression,
fraud, or malice. Id.
77. No. 1-02-CV-810872, 2005 WL 3974505 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 27, 2005) (verdict summary)
(awarding $15,234,358 in punitive damages).
78. See id. (reciting facts).
79. No. GIC833693, 2005 WL 2297579 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2005) (verdict summary) (noting verdict
award of $412,113).
80. See id.
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award. Goddard is a single example of a wide set of cases in California (and a
long history of tort cases) involving issues of desecrating dead bodies.81
In Radosevich v. Amco Insurance Co.,82 a homeowner sued Amco for bad
faith denial of coverage after an Amco adjustor asserted that a water leak in her
home was a pre-existing long term leak; the plaintiff produced counterevidence.83 The jury awarded $88,830 in compensatory damages and
$1,500,000 in punitive damages, resulting in a ratio of 17:1.84 Griffin
Dewatering Corp. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York85 involved another
insurance claim. The plaintiff alleged the insurer failed to defend the
policyholder against a claim.86 The jury awarded $1,061,188 in compensatory
damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages for a ratio of approximately
10:1.87
Morris v. Western Convalescent88 was a lawsuit following allegations of
abuse and neglect of a patient in a nursing facility who underwent a leg
amputation. The jury awarded $830,108 in compensatory damages and
$12,000,000 in punitive damages for a ratio approaching 15:1.89
Other cases that yielded large ratios just short of the single-digit guideline
apparently took damage to reputation into account. For example, in O’Lee v.
Compuware Corp.,90 a wrongful termination and defamation suit, Compuware
fired several employees for running a side business with a contractor and
falsifying invoices for personal gain, among other reasons, and the employees
filed a wrongful termination and defamation suit.91 The jury found that
Compuware falsified evidence relating to the firings and awarded the plaintiffs
$1,150,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages,
yielding a ratio just short of 9:1.92 O’Lee is consistent with claims that juries
(and judges) often examine whether a defendant engaged in a cover-up of a

81. See Christensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181, 193, 202 (Cal. 1991) (ruling family members can
sue cemeteries and crematories for negligent mishandling of decedent’s remains). The court held, however,
that family members must witness the conduct in question to establish intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See id. See generally Alex W. Craigie, Burial of a Tort: The California Supreme Court’s Treatment
of Tortious Mishandling of Remains in Christensen v. Superior Court, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 909 (1992-1993)
(exploring background of tortious liability for mishandling human remains and examining Christiansen
decision).
82. No. 2002076548, 2005 WL 4126683 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2005) (verdict summary).
83. See id. (reciting facts).
84. See id. (indicating amount of award).
85. No. BC310030, 2005 WL 2297571 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 30, 2005) (verdict summary).
86. See id. (reciting facts).
87. See id. (noting value of damage award).
88. No. BC310030, 2005 WL 2297571 (Cal Super. Ct. June 30, 2005) (verdict summary).
89. See id. (indicating amount of award).
90. No. 406409, 2005 WL 2428694 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 7, 2005) (verdict summary).
91. See id. (reciting facts). Compuware alleged that the employees were running a side business with a
contractor and without Compuware’s knowledge; that they had falsified invoices for personal gain and
conspired with a contractor, and had an illicit and undisclosed relationship. See id.
92. See id. (noting damage award).
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problem and whether the plaintiff can provide a “smoking gun,” or other
explicit evidence of the cover-up. For example, in Mathias v. Accor Economy
Lodging,93 Judge Posner upheld a ratio of punitive to compensatory damages of
37.2:1.94 In doing so, Judge Posner argued evidence that the defendant
repeatedly engaged in the behavior—and attempted to cover up the behavior
when confronted—provided the court with the ability to hand out a large
punitive damage award.95
In Hettick v. FedEx Corp.,96 a sexual harassment case, two plaintiffs were
awarded $328,000 in compensatory damages and $2,000,000 in punitive
damages, resulting in a 6:1 ratio. The female plaintiff alleged that her FedEx
coworker developed an obsessive crush on her, alleging that his behavior had
become so stalker-like over a three-year period that she hid from him at work.97
According to her testimony, she made many verbal and written complaints to
managers, but management never took corrective action. Another plaintiff in
Hettick alleged that the same coworker had also sexually harassed her with
comments and intimidating behavior.98 Both plaintiffs alleged that FedEx
management failed to take sufficient steps to prevent the harassment and that a
manager ratified the oppressive and malicious behavior of the perpetrator, thus
entitling them to punitive damages. In defense, FedEx contended that plaintiffs
and the alleged perpetrator were friends; that the conduct of the coworker was
not pervasive, oppressive, or malicious; and that it did not view the contact
between them as sexual harassment, or at least it did not have knowledge of
conduct that amounted to sexual harassment. Additionally, FedEx contended
that sufficient corrective action had been taken. FedEx also contended that its
managing director was not a “managing agent” for purposes of punitive
damages.99 The jury, siding with the plaintiffs, found sufficient evidence of
behavior that fit California’s requirements for punitive damages (pervasive,
oppressive, and malicious behavior), and awarded punitive damages.
Several other California cases merit description because of the magnitude of
the punitive damages award even though the punitive to compensatory ratios
were modest in size. Savaglio v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc.100 was a class action suit
involving 115,919 California hourly workers in Wal-Mart and Sam’s Clubs.
The workers alleged that Wal-Mart systematically refused to give them meal
breaks as required by California law. Evidence from time cards revealed
93. 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003).
94. Id. at 674, 678.
95. Posner also argues that a case where a large compensatory award is impossible may result in a large
ratio, as well as behavior that cannot be addressed by criminal torts.
96. No. 103CV010014, 2005 WL 491167 (Cal Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2005) (verdict summary).
97. See id. (reciting facts).
98. See id.
99. See id. (indicating FedEx defense).
100. No. C8356877, 2005 WL 3804468 (Cal. Super Ct. Dec. 22, 2005) (verdict summary). Savaglio is
also in the BJS database.
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8,100,000 violations between January 2001 and May 2006.101 The plaintiffs
contended that Wal-Mart knew of these violations but took steps to conceal
them.102 The jury awarded compensatory damages of $66,131,858 and punitive
damages of $115,000,000, resulting in a punitive to compensatory ratio of
1.7:1.103
Lexar Media v. Toshiba Corp.104 was a business dispute involving claims of
unfair competition, trade secrets, and breach of fiduciary duty. The jury
awarded $284,450,000 in compensatory damages and $84,000,000 in punitive
damages, yielding a ratio of .3:1.
Baker v. PrivatAir Inc.105 involved a compensatory award of $51,368,000
and a punitive award of $10,000,000, yielding a ratio of 0.2:1. Baker involved
an age discrimination claim against PrivatAir and a number of persons
associated with the company. Baker, a sixty-three-year-old decorated pilot,
was employed by PrivatAir for many years, and, after being accused of safety
violations, was replaced with a younger pilot.106 The jury found that the safety
violations were false and that the younger pilot who replaced Baker was a
friend of one of the persons involved in the his dismissal.107
C. Florida108
Turning to Florida, thirty-two cases with requests for punitive damages
appeared in our Westlaw database and thirteen resulted in punitive awards.
Only one case exceeded the single digit ratio. In Cabrera v. Eller Media
Co.,109 a boy died from electrocution while taking cover in a Miami bus shelter.
The victim’s father alleged that the bus shelter owned by the defendant had
faulty wiring because it was improperly installed, lacked fusing bonding, and
had an incorrect transformer. Eller argued that lightning caused the boy’s
death, but at trial evidence was introduced that there was less than a 1% chance
that lightning was the cause of the death.110 The jury awarded $4,100,000 in
compensatory damages and $61,000,000 in punitive damages, producing a ratio
of 15:1. This case is particularly interesting because the jury learned that Eller
was worth $458,000,000, and it is possible that the jury considered the
defendant’s financial worth when deciding punitive damages. Under Florida
law the jury may consider the net worth of a defendant in determining the
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See id. (reciting facts).
See id.
See id. (indicating damage award).
No. CV812458, 2005 WL 3729077 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005) (verdict summary).
No. BC322198, 2005 WL 3729059 (Cal Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2005) (verdict summary).
See id. (reciting facts).
See id.
The American Tort Reform Association has routinely referred to Florida as a “judicial hell-hole.”
AMERICAN TORT REFORM FOUNDATION, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES (2009).
109. No. 98-23808 CA 05, 2005 WL 3030137 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 24, 2005) (verdict summary).
110. See id. (reciting facts).

VIDMARHOLMAN_LEAD_FORMATTED_6952884.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN STATE COURTS IN 2005: A NEW AUDIT

8/4/2010 8:37 AM

877

amount of punitive damages.111 Many states, in contrast, forbid the use of
wealth in assessing punitive damages.
D. Illinois
Illinois had only seven cases in Westlaw in 2005 that resulted in punitive
awards, one of which, Blount v. Stroud,112 produced a double-digit ratio.
Defendant Stroud owned and served as general manager of Jovon Broadcasting
Corp. Plaintiff Blount was an employee who had been promoted to local sales
manager, which entailed supervising four account executives. She alleged that
Stroud and Jovon contracted to pay her a 2.5% commission on all new business
generated by her account executives, but she claimed she never received the
commission.113 She sued, alleging failure to pay commissions, in violation of
her contract. Additionally, she claimed retaliatory termination on the grounds
that she had refused to agree to commit perjury in connection with a
coworker’s discrimination lawsuit, seeking punitive damages in connection
therewith as well as on the grounds that Stroud made several defamatory
statements about her to third parties during her employment and after she was
terminated.114 Stroud and Jovon denied contracting to pay the plaintiff’s
commissions, attempting to coerce her to commit perjury, or making
defamatory comments. The defense also filed two counterclaims alleging
breach of duty and unjust enrichment for accepting a consulting fee for services
that were never performed. The jury awarded the plaintiff back pay for the
employment termination and damages for physical and emotional suffering
amounting to $282,350 in compensatory damages, and rendered the $2,800,000
punitive award in relation to the retaliation claim, a ratio of 10:1. However, the
jury did not find for the plaintiff on the claims of defamation or intentional
infliction of emotional distress.115
E. Missouri
Missouri had twelve punitive damages awards reported in 2005 but only two
exceeded the single-digit ratio. In Hampton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile

111. See Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Farish, 464 So.2d 530, 533 (Fla. 1985) (emphasizing
defendant’s net worth one factor to consider when determining punitive damages).
112. No. 01 L 2330, 2005 WL 4001082 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 21, 2005) (verdict summary).
113. See id. (reciting facts).
114. See id. Other claims included wrongful termination in violation of Illinois public policy, intentional
interference with business expectancy with a prospective business partner and Blount’s subsequent employer,
as well as conduct involving intention of inflicting emotional distress. Id.
115. Compare Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5-05-0723, 2010 WL 378525 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 1, 2010)
(verdict summary). After another motorist rear ended Dora Jablonski’s Lincoln Town Car and caused the gas
tank to explode, she suffered burns to her head, face, ears, nose, shoulders, chest, arms, hands, legs, ankles and
feet. Her husband died of thermal burns and inhalation injury. The jury awarded $28,167,715 in compensatory
damages and $15,000,000 in punitive damages, yielding a punitive to compensatory ratio of 0.5:1. See id.
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Insurance Co.,116 the plaintiff purchased a vehicle that was later stolen and
found burned. Hampton filed a claim for replacement but State Farm, alleging
fraud, denied the claim and forced criminal charges against Hampton and a
codefendant. After acquittal, the defendants filed suit against State Farm
alleging malicious prosecution, the tort of outrage, abuse of process, and
contract fraud. The case resulted in a compensatory award of $10,300 and a
punitive award of $800,000, yielding a ratio of 78:1.117
Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.118 resulted in a compensatory
award of $2,000,000 and a punitive award of $20,000,000, a ratio of 10:1 in
favor of a smoker of Kool cigarettes who died of cancer. The jury found that
the defendant was only 25% liable, which reduced the compensatory award to
$500,000, but the punitive award stood.119
F. New Jersey
New Jersey had only three reported punitive damages awards, one of which
reached a ratio of 1.2:1. In Verni v. Lanzaro,120 the plaintiff sued both the
driver of a vehicle and the concession provider at a major sporting arena in
connection with a drunk-driving collision that resulted in the death of another
person and a severe disability for plaintiff Verni. Verni alleged that the driver,
while spending the afternoon at a professional football game, drank alcohol at a
concession stand operated by Aramark and was permitted to drive away from
the stadium despite his obvious intoxication.121 The jury awarded $60,450,000
in compensatory damages and $75,000,000 in punitive damages.122 Verni is an
example of one of the few exceptions to the cap on punitive damages—in this
case, drunk driving—that is part of the New Jersey punitive damages statute.
G. New York
New York only had five punitive damages awards reported in the Westlaw
database, none of which exceeded the single-digit ratio. The largest ratio was
Rose v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,123 involving a $3,420,000
compensatory award and a $17,100,000 punitive award, a ratio of 5:1. The
punitive award was leveled at Brown & Williamson as successor-in-interest to
Philip Morris on the finding that it disregarded technology that would have
allowed production of safer cigarettes, and intentionally marketed addictive

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

No. 02-CV-211426, 2005 WL 3636236 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 26, 2005) (verdict summary).
See id. (noting amount of damage award).
No. 03CV212922, 2005 WL 3505692 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Feb. 3, 2005) (verdict summary).
See id. (discussing result).
No. BER-L-10488-00, 2005 WL 427792 (N.J. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2005) (verdict summary).
See id. (reciting facts).
See id. (noting amount of damage award).
No. 101996/02, 2005 WL 1817523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 28, 2005) (verdict summary).
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cigarettes.124
H. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania had only three reported punitive awards, none of which
exceeded a single-digit ratio. In Fromm v. Hershey Medical Center,125 the jury
awarded the estate of a cardiac patient $168,400 in compensatory damages and
$1,000,000 in punitive damages, a ratio of 6:1. Fromm involved wrongful
death and medical malpractice claims by the estate of a sixty-two-year-old man
who was scheduled for cardiac surgery at Hershey Medical Center. Upon
meeting with the patient, the hospital’s financial counselor implied that it
would not perform the surgery unless the patient could figure out a way to pay
for it. The patient, upset by this, left without scheduling the surgery and before
he could reschedule, suffered a heart attack and died. His estate sued,
contending that the hospital denied care based on the patient’s inability to pay.
Additionally, the cardiologists were sued for medical malpractice on the
grounds that they should have done more to ensure Boltz had the surgery. The
hospital countered that the counselor never told Boltz that his surgery would
not be scheduled until he could pay and that Boltz made the decision himself to
leave the hospital. Boltz’s estate asked for unspecified damages and also asked
the jury to find that Hershey’s conduct was outrageous, warranting punitive
damages. The jury found the two cardiologists not liable but found Hersey
hospital liable, and, citing intentional misconduct, awarded a large punitive
award.126
I. Texas
Texas had only six punitive damages awards in the 2005 Westlaw data, none
of which involved a ratio that exceeded the single-digit guideline.
V. INSIGHTS ABOUT PROCESS AND LARGE RATIOS
The data from our constructed Westlaw database add important insights to
the understanding of punitive damages. The BJS data indicate that pleadings
involving punitive damages claims often do not result in punitive or
compensatory damages. The Westlaw data take us further by providing a
sketch of the procedural factors that constrain and control punitive damages.
Most particularly, they strongly suggest that judicial gate-keeping prevents
many routine claims from ever being put to the jury in the first place, as judges
apply common law and statutes to eliminate inappropriate claims. The second
124. See id. (reciting facts).
125. Nos. 1270s-1999 and 2510s-1999, 2005 WL 1705460 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. June 16, 2005) (verdict
summary).
126. See id.; 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301.812-A(g) (setting range for punitive damages against physicians);
Appendix A.
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insight is that when ratios exceed the single-digit guideline enunciated by the
U.S. Supreme Court, it is arguable that the degree of reprehensibility is no
different from TXO, in which the Supreme Court approved a high ratio because
of the reprehensibility of the defendant’s behavior. The data also hint at
nuances in jury decisions, similar to those noted by Vidmar and Rose, in that
while rendering a punitive damage award, juries rejected other claims made by
the plaintiff.127
VI. CONCLUSION
In Exxon Shipping v. Baker, the Supreme Court acknowledged as empirical
fact that there is no significant evidence of runaway punitive awards, that there
had been no increase in awards over the past decades, and that the majority of
punitive awards did not exceed a single digit ratio. Despite these findings, the
Court continued to be concerned about the exceptions to its stated guideline,
referring to their stark unpredictability.
The data in this article provide an update consistent with past empirical
research. However, we took our research beyond the extant literature by
providing a profile of who asks for and who receives punitive damages, and
provided a tentative outline of the factors that prevent recovery, including the
burden of proving malicious intent accompanied by judicial supervision of
statutory guidelines on punitive damages.
A summary of the BJS data is helpful in putting the findings into
perspective. The 2005 Civil Justice Survey indicates that for the forty-six
courts, representative of the 75 largest county courts in the United States, there
were 6427 civil jury trials, and of these punitive damages were requested in
pleadings 567 times, or 8.8% of cases. In result, 131 trials involved the
awarding of punitive damages—2% of all trials and 23% of cases in which the
pleadings included a request for punitive damages. Of the punitive award
verdicts, only 14 cases exceeded the single-digit ratio guideline that has
concerned the Supreme Court. Additional research, using jury verdict
reporters, produced very few (eleven) cases where the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages exceeded a single digit.
The Supreme Court has concluded, in the past, that the appropriateness of
awards is a qualitative judgment. In BMW, the Court articulated the view that
excessive punitive awards were acceptable when the ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages was low, when the defendant’s conduct was
particularly reprehensible, and when alternative state sanctions for similar
misconduct are unavailable. In examining the cases in the present article, the
vast majority fit the first criterion: the ratio of punitive to compensatory
127. See generally Vidmar & Rose, supra note 32. It is worth noting that neither database tells us about
post-verdict appeals and settlements of the awards. Such information would permit an even more complete
picture of the impact of punitive awards on defendants.
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damages is low. In the eleven cases in our Westlaw database with large
punitive to compensatory ratios, there is often arguably clear evidence pointing
to the reprehensibility of actions by the defendant. In Goddard v. Holy Cross
Catholic Cemetery, the jury evaluated the effect of the loss of a decedent’s
remains and the conspiracy of the defendant in failing to report the loss to the
plaintiff. In Hampton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the jury
considered the actions of the defendant (malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, and contract fraud) reprehensible. Similar actions by insurance
companies in Radosevich v. Amco Insurance Co. and Griffin Dewatering Corp.
v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York also resulted in large punitive awards.
In Blount v. Stroud, the jury awarded punitive damages after testimony
indicating that the plaintiff was fired for refusing to perjure herself in a prior
lawsuit against the defendant.
Other cases involved causes of action where there was not a clear substitute
in state law. In Hettick v. FedEx Corp., the failure to protect female employees
from sexual harassment led to a large punitive award. In Smith v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. and Rose v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
the plaintiffs were awarded large punitive damages in cases involving the
actions of tobacco companies.
Consider again the Supreme Court’s conclusion in TXO, approving a 526:1
punitive to compensatory damages ratio because the defendant engaged in
“egregiously tortious conduct.”128 Our Westlaw data summaries of facts
alleged in the trials resulting in verdicts exceeding the single digit guideline
allows an arguable position that, like the Supreme Court in TXO, the juries
found evidence that defendants had engaged in similar reprehensible behavior.
We are left with a conclusion that empirical facts do not justify the Supreme
Court’s continuing concern about the unpredictability and the ratios associated
with punitive damage awards.

128. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 466 (1993).
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APPENDIX: A FULL SURVEY OF LEGAL AND MONETARY LIMITS ON
PUNITIVE DAMAGES, BY STATE
State

Available?129

Legal Constraints on

$ Cap?131

Punitive Damages130
AL

Yes

Punitive damages are only

Monetary Limits on Punitive
Damages132

Yes

Actual limits on punitive

available “where it is

damages are three times

proven by clear and

compensatory damages or

convincing evidence that

$500,000, whichever is

the defendant consciously

greater.134 Wrongful death or

or deliberately engaged in

intentional infliction of physical

oppression, fraud,

injury cases have no caps.

wantonness, or malice with
regard to the plaintiff.”133
AK

Yes

If the plaintiff

Yes

Punitive damages cannot

demonstrates that the

exceed three times

“defendant's conduct (1)

compensatory damages or

was outrageous, including

$500,000. The limit may be

acts done with malice or

raised to the greater of up to

bad motives; or (2)

four times compensatory

evidenced reckless

damages or aggregate financial

indifference to the interest

gain (maximum $7,000,000) if

of another person” the fact

the defendant was “motivated

finder can apply punitive

by financial gain and the

damages.135

adverse consequences of the
conduct were actually known
by the defendant.”136

AR

Yes

Punitive damages are only

Yes

No more than the greater of

available if the defendant

$250,000 or three times the

(1) was aware that conduct

amount of compensatory

would result in “injury or

damages (maximum

damage and that he or she

$1,000,000). No cap is applied

continued the conduct with

if defendant meant to cause the

malice or in reckless

harm and did cause the harm.138

disregard of the

129.
130.

Are punitive damages available in the state?
What are the legal requirements, statutorily or by common law, governing the award of punitive

damages?

131. Does the state have a cap in effect for punitive damages?
132. What are the monetary limits on punitive damages in the state?
133. ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (2009).
134. See § 6-11-21. The cap is different if defendant is a small business (i.e., with a net worth of
less than $2,000,000) In such a case, the cap is $50,000 or 10% of the business’s net worth. Id.
135. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(b)(1)-(2) (2009).
136. Id. § 09.17.020 (f), (g).
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consequences,” or (2)
“intentionally pursued a
course of conduct for the
purpose of causing injury
or damage.”137
AZ

Yes

No

Punitive damages are

prohibits laws limiting amount

defendant acted knowing

of damages in personal injury

that the course of conduct

and wrongful death cases: “No

caused a substantial risk of

law shall be enacted . . .

harm,139 for both general

limiting the amount of damages

and specific deterrence,140

to be recovered for causing the

and in cases of “outrageous

death or injury of any other
person.”142

141

conduct.”
CO

Yes

The Arizona Constitution

available in Arizona if the

Punitive damages are

Yes

Generally, punitive damages

awarded in “circumstances

should not exceed

of fraud, malice, or willful

compensatory damages, but the

143

and wanton conduct.”

court may increase the punitive
damages (to a maximum of
three times the amount of actual
damages) if the defendant has
“continued the behavior,”
“repeated the action,” or
“further aggravated” the
claimant’s damages through
their “willful and wanton
conduct.”144

CA

Yes

“In an action for the breach

No

of an obligation not arising
from contract, where it is
proven by clear and
convincing evidence that

138. Id. § 16-55-208.
137. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-206 (2009).
139. Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Ariz. 1987).
140. See id.
141. Smith v. Chapman, 564 P.2d 900, 903 (Ariz. 1977); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS,
§ 908, cmt. b (1939).
142. ARIZ. CONS. ART. 2, § 31 (2010); see Smith v. Myers, 887 P.2d 541, 544 (Ariz. 1994).
143. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (2008).
144. Id. § 13-21-102 (1)(a)(3). Punitive damages are not allowed in any action against a health care
professional that involves the approved use of drugs or clinically justified non-standard uses, within
“prudent” health care standards, or written informed consent. Id. § 13-64-302.5(5) (2001) (limiting
punitive damage awards against health care professionals).
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the defendant has been
guilty of oppression, fraud,
or malice, the plaintiff, in
addition to the actual
damages, may recover
damages for the sake of
example and by way of
punishing the
defendant.”145

CT

Yes

The single purpose of

Yes

Punitive damages are limited to

punitive damages in

the actual cost of the litigation,

Connecticut is to

including attorney's fees.147

compensate the plaintiff for

Punitive damages are capped at

146

legal expenses.

two times the compensatory
damages in product liability
cases and cases involving
motor vehicle torts.148

DE

Yes

Punitive damages are

No

available in medical
malpractice cases if the
defendant caused an injury
that was “maliciously
intended or was the result
of willful or wanton
misconduct.”149
FL

Yes

The defendant’s conduct

Yes

Punitive damages are capped

must be “intentional

unless the plaintiff

misconduct or gross

demonstrates a specific intent

negligence”150 for punitive

to harm. The cap is the greater

damages; punitive damages

of three times compensatory

are available even if

damages or $500,000, unless a

compensatory damages are

supervisor ratified the behavior,

not awarded.151

in which case the cap is the
greater of four times

145. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1997).
146. See Berry v. Loiseau, 614 A.2d 414, 433 (1992) (upholding limit on punitive damages). The
Connecticut Supreme Court noted that a “longstanding rule in Connecticut limit[ed] common law
punitive damages to a party’s litigation costs,” and declined to overturn the “well established rule
governing punitive damages awards.” See id.
147. See generally Freeman v. Alamo Mgmt. Co., 607 A.2d 370 (Conn. 1992).
148. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-295, 52-240(b) (2005)
149. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 18, § 6855 (1999).
150. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72(2) (West 2005).
151. See id. § 768.72(2).
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compensatory damages or
$2,000,000.152

GA

Yes

Punitive damages are

Yes

Punitive damages may not

allowable if the defendant

exceed $250,000,154 except in

showed “willful

cases of product liability155 and

misconduct, malice, fraud,

“if it is found that the defendant

wantonness, oppression, or

acted, or failed to act, with the

that entire want of care

specific intent to cause harm, or

which would raise the

that the defendant acted or

presumption of conscious

failed to act while under the

indifference to

influence of alcohol, drugs

consequences.”153

other than lawfully
prescribed,”156 where there is
no cap.

HI

Yes

“The plaintiff must prove

No general

In medical malpractice, there is

by clear and convincing

limit

a limit on noneconomic

evidence that the defendant

damages for physical pain and

has acted wantonly or

suffering of $375,000.158

oppressively or with such
malice as implies a spirit of
mischief or criminal
indifference to civil
obligations, or where there
has been some willful
misconduct or that entire
want of care which would
raise the presumption of a
conscious indifference to
consequences.”157
IA

Yes

Punitive damages are

No

available if the defendant
engaged in conduct that
constituted a “willful and
wanton disregard for the

152. See id. §§ 768.725, 768.72(2).
153. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (West 2005).
154. Id. § 51-12-5.1(g).
155. Id. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1).
156. Id. § 51-12-5.1(f).
157. Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 579 (Haw. 1989)
158. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.7 ) (2009) (enumerating tort actions exempt from $375,000 cap,
not including medical malpractice). But see § 663-10.9(2) (2009) (stating $375,000 cap on damages for
pain and suffering).
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rights and safety of
another.”159

ID

Yes

The plaintiff is required to

Punitive damages may not

show the defendant

exceed the greater of $250,000

engaged in “oppressive,

or three times the compensatory

fraudulent, malicious or

damages.161

160

outrageous conduct”
IL

Yes

Punitive damages may be

No

awarded if the defendant is
shown to act “with evil
motive or with a reckless
and outrageous
indifference to a highly
unreasonable risk of harm
and with a conscious
indifference to the rights
and safety of others.”162
IN

Yes

Punitive damages may be

Yes

Punitive damages may not

awarded if the defendant

exceed the greater of three

“acted with the malice,

times the compensatory award

fraud, gross negligence, or

or $50,000.164

oppressiveness which was
not the result of a mistake
of fact or law, honest error
or judgment,
overzealousness, mere
negligence, or other human
failing.”163
KS

Yes

The plaintiff must

Yes

The punitive damages must not

demonstrate that the

exceed the lesser of the

defendant “acted toward

defendant’s annual income, up

the plaintiff with willful

to 50% of the net worth of the

conduct, wanton conduct,

defendant, as determined by the

165

fraud or malice.”

court, or $5,000,000.166
However, if the conduct of the

159. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(1)(a) (1998).
160. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(1) (2004).
161. Id. § 6-1604(3) (2004).
162. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 5/2-1115.05(b) (West 2009).
163. Nelson v. Jimison, 634 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
164. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-4 (West 2009); see also USA Life One Ins. Co. of Ind. v.
Nuckolls, 682 N.E.2d 534, 541 (Ind. 1997) (setting forth general requirements for recovery of punitive
damages in Indiana).
165. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(c) (2009).
166. Id. § 60-3702(e)
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defendant results in a profit that
exceeds these caps, the cap is
raised to “1 1/2 times the
amount of profit which the
defendant gained or is expected
to gain as a result of the
defendant's misconduct.”167
KY

Yes

Punitive damages are

No

“The General Assembly shall

available when the

have no power to limit the

defendant acted with

amount to be recovered for

“oppression, fraud or

injuries resulting in death, or

malice.”168

for injuries to person or
property.”169

LA

No

Punitive damages are

No

prohibited by statute in
Louisiana, yet there are
exceptions for drunk
driving,170 the unlawful
interception of
communications,171 and for
those engaged in housing
discrimination in violation
of the Open Housing
Act.172
MA

No

Punitive damages are

No

prohibited by common
law.173
ME

Yes

“[I]n order to recover

No general

$250,000 for wrongful death

punitive damages, a

limit

actions.175

“The purpose of punitive

No general

In medical malpractice cases,

damages is not only to

limit

the award of noneconomic

plaintiff must prove by
clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant
acted with malice.”174
MD

Yes

167. Id. § 60-3702(f).
168. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184(2) (West 2009).
169. KY. CONST. § 54 (2009).
170. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 2315.4 (2009).
171. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1312(A) (2009).
172. Id. § 51:2613(E).
173. See Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir. 1968); see also Dorothea C. Cadiff et al.,
Note, Punitive Tort Damages in New England, 41 B.U. L. REV. 389, 390 (1961).
174. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1354 (Me. 1985).
175. 18 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 18, § 2-804(b) (2009).
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punish the defendant for

damages is limited to $500,000.

egregiously bad conduct

There is a $350,000 limit on

toward the plaintiff, but

noneconomic damages in

also to deter the defendant

personal injury actions.177

and others contemplating
similar behavior.”176
MI

Yes

In Michigan, punitive (or

“The purpose of exemplary

exemplary) damages are

damages is not to punish the

limited to “compensation

defendant, but to render the

178

for injury to feelings.”

plaintiff whole. When
compensatory damages can
make the injured party whole,
exemplary damages must not
be awarded.”179

MN

Yes

The defendant must “show

No

deliberate disregard for the
rights and safety of
others.”180
MO

Yes

"Punitive damages may be

No

awarded for conduct that is
outrageous, because of the
defendant's evil motive or
reckless indifference to the
rights of others."181
MS

Yes

The defendant must have

Yes

Punitive damages are capped,

acted with “actual malice,

with the caps relating to the net

gross negligence which

worth of the defendant. If the

evidences a willful,

defendant is worth more than

wanton, or reckless

$1,000,000,000, the damages

disregard for the safety of

are capped at $20,000,000. For

176. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 682 A.2d 1143, 1161 (Md. 1996); see also Bowden
v. Caldor Inc., 710 A.2d 267, 276 (Md. 1998) (reaffirming punitive damages stated in Garrett); Stephen
J. Shapiro, Punitive Damages in Maryland: Reconciling Federal Law, State Law, and the Pattern Jury
Instructions, 38 U. BALT. L. REV. 27, 33 (2007) (noting purpose of punitive damages in Maryland as
stated in Garrett).
177. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (West 2004); Murphy v. Edmonds, 601
A.2d 102, 116 (Md. 1992) (upholding cap on personal injury actions).
178. Jackson Printing Co., Inc. v. Mitan, 425 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); see also
Veselenak v Smith, 327 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Mich. 1982).
179. Jackson Printing Co., Inc., 425 N.W.2d at 794.
180. MINN. STAT. ANN § 549.20(1)(a) (2010).
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979); see also Altenhofen v. Fabricor, Inc., 81
S.W.3d 578, 590 (Mo. 2002) (citing Burnett); Burnett v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780, 787 (Mo. 1989)
(laying out Missouri’s punitive damages standard).

VIDMARHOLMAN_LEAD_FORMATTED_6952884.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

8/4/2010 8:37 AM

PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN STATE COURTS IN 2005: A NEW AUDIT
others” or committed

889

a defendant worth more than

182

actual fraud.

$750,000,000 but less than
$1,000,000,000, the cap is
$15,000,000. Defendants
worth more than $500,000,000
but less than $750,000,000
cannot pay more than
$5,000,000. Those worth
between $100,000,000 and
$500,000,000 have a cap of
$3,750,000. A cap of
$2,500,000 is in place for those
worth more than $50,000,000
but less than $100,000,000. All
other cases have a cap of 2% of
the defendant’s net worth.183

MT

Yes

Punitive damages can be

Yes

Punitive damage awards may

awarded if the plaintiff

not exceed the lesser of

demonstrates that the

$10,000,000 or 3% of a

defendant is “guilty of

defendant's net worth.185

actual fraud or actual
malice.”184
NC

Yes

Punitive damages are

Yes

The punitive award may not

available “to punish a

exceed the greater of three

defendant for egregiously

times the compensatory award

wrongful acts and to deter

or $250,000.187

the defendant and others
from committing similar
wrongful acts.”186
ND

Yes

Exemplary damages may

Yes

Punitive damages are capped at

be awarded if the defendant

the greater of $250,000 or two

is guilty of “oppression,

times the compensatory

fraud, or actual malice.”188

damages.190

182. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (2009).
183. Id. § 11-1-65(3)(a)(i)-(vi).
184. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27-1-221(1) (2009).
185. Id. § 27-1-220(3). Actual malice exists “if the defendant has knowledge of facts or
intentionally disregards facts that create a high probability of injury to the plaintiff.” Id.. Furthermore,
defendant must: “deliberately proceed[] to act in conscious or intentional disregard of the high
probability of injury to the plaintiff; or . . . deliberately proceed[] to act with indifference to the high
probability of injury to the plaintiff.” Id. § 27-1-221(2). Actual fraud exists when a defendant: “makes
a representation with knowledge of its falsity; or . . . conceals a material fact with the purpose of
depriving the plaintiff of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” Id. § 27-1-221(3).
186. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-1 (2009).
187. Id. § 1D-25.
188. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-11(1) (2009).
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Exemplary damages are
awarded “for the sake of
example and by way of
punishing the
defendant.”189

NE

No

Prohibited by common law.

No

“It has been a fundamental
rule of law in this state that
punitive, vindictive, or
exemplary damages will
not be allowed, and that the
measure of recovery in all
civil cases is compensation
for the injury sustained.”191
NH

No

“No punitive damages shall

No

be awarded in any action,
unless otherwise provided
by statute.”192
NJ

Yes

Punitive damages are

Yes

The cap on punitive damages is

available if the

the greater of five times the

“defendant's acts or

compensatory damages or

omissions, and such acts or

$350,000.194 Hate crimes,

omissions were actuated by

discrimination, AIDS testing

actual malice or

disclosure, sex abuse, and

accompanied by a wanton

drunk drivers are excluded

and willful disregard of

from the cap.195

persons who foreseeably
might be harmed by those
acts or omissions.”193

190. Id. § 32-03.2-11(4).
189. Id. § 32-03.2-11(1).
191. See Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Neb. 1960) (calling prohibition on punitive
damages “fundamental rule of law” in Nebraska); see also Wilfong v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry.
Co., 262 N.W. 537, 540 (Neb. 1935) (holding damages for torts limited to compensation for actual
injury sustained); Bee Pub. Co. v. World Pub. Co., 82 N.W. 28, 29 (Neb. 1900) (stating measure of
recovery compensation for injury sustained); Atkins v. Gladwish, 41 N.W.347, 350 (Neb. 1889)
(acknowledging rule limiting recovery to damage for injury sustained). See generally Boyer v. Barr, 8
Neb. 68 (Neb. 1878) (calling question of punitives “tabulraza”).
192. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (2010).
193. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.12(4)(a) (2009).
194. See id. § 2A:15-5.14.
195. See id. § 2A:15-5.14(c) (indicating exceptions to punitive damage cap).
The provisions of subsection b. of this section shall not apply to causes of action brought
pursuant to P.L.1993, c.137 (C.2A:53A-21 et seq.), P.L.1945, c.169 (C.10:5-1 et seq.),
P.L.1989, c.303 (C.26:5C-5 et seq.), P.L.1992, c.109 (C.2A:61B-1) or P.L.1986, c.105,
(C.34:19-1 et seq.), or in cases in which a defendant has been convicted pursuant to
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“Punitive or exemplary
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No

damages may be awarded
only when the conduct of
the wrongdoer may be said
to be maliciously
intentional, fraudulent,
oppressive, or committed
recklessly or with a wanton
disregard of the
plaintiff[’s] rights.”196
NV

Yes

Punitive damages can be

Yes

Damages are capped at three

awarded when the

times the compensatory

defendant is “guilty of

damages if the compensatory

oppression, fraud, or

damages are more than

malice.”197

$100,000 and $300,000 if the
compensatory damages are less
than $100,000.198 Cases
involving product liability,
insurance fraud, toxic waste,
housing discrimination, and
defamation are not subject to
these caps.199

NY

Yes

The defendant must act

No

with “intentional or
deliberate wrongdoing,
aggravating or outrageous
circumstances, fraudulent
or evil motive, or
conscious act in willful and
wanton disregard of
another's rights.”200
OH

Yes

Punitive damages are

No

N.J.S.2C:11-3, N.J.S.2C:11-4, R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) or
the equivalent under the laws of any other jurisdiction.
Id. § 2A: 15-5.14(c).
196. Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat. Bank, 418 P.2d 191, 199 (N.M. 1966).
197. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005(1) (2009).
198. Id. §§ 42.005(1)(a)-(b).
199. Id. § 42.005(2).
200. Pearlman v. Friedman Alpren & Green LLP, 750 N.Y.S.2d 869, 869 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
(holding punitive damages unwarranted absent deliberate wrongdoing,, evil motive, etc.); see also Don
Buchwald & Assocs., Inc. v. Rich, 723 N.Y.S.2d 8, 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (allowing punitive
damages only for intentional wrongdoing, outrageous fraud, or willful and wanton acts); Le Mistral, Inc.
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817(N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (stating exemplary damages
only allowed when wrong aggravated by evil, willful, intentional or reckless indifference).
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available if the defendant
acted with, or authorized
acts of, malice or
aggravated fraud.201

OK

Yes

An award of punitive

Yes

If the defendant acted with

damages depends on the

reckless disregard, punitive

degree to which the

damages are capped at the

defendant: engaged in

greater of $100,000 or actual

behavior that was a hazard

damages.203 In cases where the

to the public; profited from

defendant acted with malice,

the behavior, involved

the cap is the greatest of

concealment of the acts;

$500,000, two times the

was aware of the acts; the

compensatory damages, or the

number of employees

financial benefit of the behavior

involved in the act (for

to the defendant.204 If it is

corporations); and the

found beyond a reasonable

financial worth of the

doubt that the defendant acted

202

defendant.

in a manner that threatened a
human life, there is no cap.205

OR

Yes

Punitive damages are

No general

Punitive damages are

available when it is proven

limits

unavailable in medical
malpractice cases.207

by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant
acted with malice or “a
reckless and outrageous
indifference to a highly
unreasonable risk of harm
and has acted with a
conscious indifference to
the health, safety and
welfare of others.”206
PA

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Yes

Punitive damages are

Yes

Punitive damages are capped at

available when the

200% of the compensatory

defendant engages in

damages, unless the defendant

outrageous conduct, or has

is guilty of intentional

an “evil motive or [a]

misconduct, which has no cap.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.18 (2010).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 9.1(A) (2008).
Id. § 9.1(B).
Id. § 9.1(C).
Id. § 9.1(D).
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.730 (West 2009).
Id. § 31.740.
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Punitive damages cannot be

208

rights of others.”

less than $100,000, unless the
compensatory damages are less
than $100,000.209

RI

Yes

“[P]unitive damages are

No

proper only in situations in
which the defendant's
actions are so willful,
reckless, or wicked that
they amount to
criminality.”210
SC

Yes

The defendant must engage

No

in conduct demonstrating
“malice, ill will, a
conscious indifference to
the rights of others, or a
reckless disregard thereof”
for punitive damages to be
awarded.211
SD

Yes

Punitive damages are

No

available when the
defendant engages in
“oppression, fraud, or
malice, actual or presumed,
or in any case of wrongful
injury to animals, being
subjects of property,
committed intentionally or
by willful and wanton
misconduct, in disregard of
humanity.” 212
TN

Yes

Punitive damages are

No

awarded “only if [the
court] finds a defendant has
acted either (1)

208. Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1096 (Pa. 1985) (stating Pennsylvania
guidelines for awarding punitive damages).
209. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301.812-A(g) (1999).
210. Greater Providence Deposit Corp. v. Jenison, 485 A.2d 1242, 1244 (R.I. 1984) (illustrating use
of punitive damages in punishing offender and deterring future conduct, not compensating plaintiff); see
also Serra v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 463 A.2d 142, 151 (R.I. 1983) (upholding principle that punitive
damages only for willful, reckless, or wicked actions).
211. King v. Allstate Insurance Co., 251 S.E.2d 194, 263 (S.C. 1979); see also S.C. CODE ANN. §
15-33-135 (2009).
212. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-2 (2009).
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intentionally, (2)
fraudulently, (3)
maliciously, or (4)
recklessly . . . .”213

TX

Yes

Punitive damages are

Yes

The cap is the greater of: the

available if the defendant

award for non-economic

engaged in fraud, malice,

damages up to $750,000 plus

or gross negligence.214

twice the award for economic
damages, or $200,000.215

UT

Yes

If the defendant engaged in

No

“willful and malicious or
intentionally fraudulent
conduct, or conduct that
manifests a knowing and
reckless indifference
toward, and a disregard of,
the rights of others,”
punitive damages may be
awarded.216
VA

Yes

Punitive damages are

Yes

Maximum cap of $ 350,000.218

available when the
defendant engages in
“negligence which is so
willful or wanton as to
evince a conscious
disregard of the rights of
others, as well as malicious
conduct, will support an
award of punitive damages
. . . .”217
VT

Yes

Punitive damages are

No

allowed when the
defendant engages in
“conduct manifesting
personal ill will,
evidencing insult or

213. See Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992) (setting out Tennessee
punitive damages rule).
214. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (a)(1)-(3) (2008).
215. See id. § 41.008(b)(1)-(2) (2009).
216. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-8-201(b) (2008).
217. Booth v. Robertson, 374 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Va. 1988) (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 231 S.E.2d
312, 316 (Va. 1977)).
218. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (2007).
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oppression, or showing a
reckless or wanton
disregard of [a party's]
rights.”219
WA

No

Punitive damages are not

No

permitted.220
WI

Yes

Damages are allowed when

No

the defendant’s behavior is
“willful, wanton or
reckless.”221
WV

Yes

Punitive damages are

No

“[T]here can be no

awarded in circumstances

mathematical bright line

where the defendant

relationship between punitive

engaged in malice,

damages and compensatory

oppression, wanton,

damages.”223

willful, reckless conduct,
or criminal indifference.222
WY

Yes

“[P]unitive damages are

No

“No law shall be enacted

awarded to punish the

limiting the amount of damages

defendant and deter others

to be recovered for causing the

from such conduct in the

injury or death of any

future.”224

person.”225

219. Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 576 A.2d 441, 449 (Vt. 1990).
220. See Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1073 (Wash. 1891) (noting doctrine of
punitive damages rests on unstable basis).
221. WIS. STAT. § 895.037(3)(b) (2006). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has since set forth the
standard that punitive damages can be awarded if the plaintiff acts purposefully disregard the plaintiff’s
rights, or engages in the conduct despite awareness that his or her acts will result in the plaintiff’s rights
being disregarded. See generally Wischer v. Mitsubishi Heavy Ind. America, 694 N.W.2d 320 (Wis.
2005); Strenke v. Hogner, 694 N.W.2d 296 (Wis. 2005) (discussing Wisconsin punitive damages
statute).
222. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 887 (W. Va. 1992) (noting
Haslip guidelines); Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872, 878-81 (W. Va. 1982) (discussing nature of punitive
damage awards).
223. TXO, 419 S.E.2d at 887.
224. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 837 (Wyo. 1994) (explaining
theory of punitive damages).
225. WYO. CONST. ART. 10 § 4 (2008).

